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Industry evolution and
R
Introduction
It is commonly accepted that research and development yields externalities in the sense that knowledge acquired in one firm spills over to other firms. Of ten knowledge spread in this way finds new applications or stimulates further innovative activity in other firms.
When these externalities are sufficiently strong an industry can exhibit aggregate increasing returns to scale to R & D.
A typical feature of models with increasing returns to scale is that they give rise to more than one equilibrium. Yet most models in this field have been designed, by use of various assumptions, to yield a single equilibrium. This paper shows that analyzing the adjustment paths toward different equilibria has important policy implications.
Alfred Marshall argued in his "Principles of Economics" that an industry with competitive firms could exhibit a decreasing long-run cost curve due to the fact that one firm's production engenders external economies in terms of educating a skilled work force and spreading knowledge gained by "learning-by-doing". Later the literature on imperfect competition disposed of this view. It was argued that a monopolist would usurp such an industry in order to internalize the externai economies.
More recently several papers have followed Arrow's (1962) lead in showing that a decentralized competitive equilibrium can exist with increasing returns to scale and externalities. For example, Romer (1986) constructs a model in which there are increasing returns to knowledge, but the growth of knowledge is limited by decreasing returns to the production of new knowledge. These models are generally designed to yield a single competitive equilibrium. Fölster (1990) considers a situation with ranges of increasing returns to scale in the production of knowledge. In these situations several competitive equilibria can arise involving different levels of 3 research. This opens the possibility that a profitable technology may be neglected merely due to a coordination problem: il all firms invested simultaneously they might all find it profitable. Yet none is willing to to risk investing too early and losing out at the expense of other firms that can enter later and draw on a pool of skilled researchers and an established knowledge base. The coordination problem is related to that analyzed in the literature on network externalities (e.g. Katz & Shapiro, 1985) . However network externalities are generally assumed on the demand side, arising, for example, by the adoption of common standards. In our case the network externality arises on the supply side and determines how many firms find it profitable to enter an R & D race.
It is shown in Fölster (1990) In the absence of common knowIedge Fölster (1990) shows experimentally that communication loses much of its coordination ability. Coordination could theoretically occur via an investor who intemalizes extemalities by purchasing all fmns. In the absence of perfect information and given some transaction costs, however, coordination may not occur be cause as soon as the coordinator is expected to succeed in purchasing a number of fIrms he thereby ensures profitability for the remaining finns. The remaining fmns will then not sell out to the coordinator at a price that makes it worthwhile to compIete the buy-out of all fIrms.
(the S-shaped function). This is shown to le ad to complicated adjustment paths that in many cases can imply a cyc1ical development of the number of firms towards long-run equilibria with either high or low numbers of firms.
R&D competition is modelled in two different ways, both supporting the hypothesis of the S-shape profit as a function of the number of incumbent firms. The first approach is a quality ladders model. The second approach is a more traditional set-up where firms minimize unit production costs. The intensity of R&D tums out to be the same for both long-run equilibria in the case of the quality ladders model. However, R&D is more intensive in the high-competition equilibrium for the cost-economizing model. Consider an industry consisting of homogenous incumbent firms engaged in R&D competition. All firms are owned by stockholders who decide whether the firm performs better in this particular industry rather than in other industrles. Stockholders can decide to let a firm switch from one industry to another thus giving rise to entry and exit.
At each moment in Hxme they choose a combination of entrles and exits by comparlng net present values that the firm can achieve within the particular industry with outside opportunity costs. The evolution of the number of firms in the industry is thus endogenously determined as a result of entry and exit decisions by stockholders.
The instantaneous expected net profit 1t of a representative incumbent firm is a function of the number of firms n currently populating the industry and of an R&D parameter u, so that 1t = 7r(n,u). The time argument is omitted here and henceforth where it does not lead to confusion. At each moment in time t a finn expects to obtain a surplus 7r(n,u)dt durlng the period (t, t+dt). The number of firms n is a real variable. The R&D parameter u is either the intensity of product innovation or unit production costs. In what follows we examine models of R&D behavior for both cases. 
(1)
which means that the rate of return on equity v Iv + 7r(n, u)/v equals the real interest rate. Equation (2) implies absence of arbitrage or capital market efficiency.
The net profit function 7r(n,u) is defined for n > O. Suppose that for each n the function 7r(n,u) has an interior maximum in the interval
This assumption reflects decreasing returns to R&D at the firm level.
Since R&D expenditures are calculated based on net profits, the firm incurs too high R & D costs if the intensity of innovation is too high or unit production costs are close to the minimum level. In subsections 8 2.2 and 2.3 we consider examples of net profit functions satisfying this property.
The dynamic problem of the incumbent frrm is to choose the time path u(t) providing a maximum to the initial value Vo subject to the equations (1)-(2). The current value Hamiltonian is
where 8 1 and 8 2 are costate variables related to the equations (1), (2).
The optimal controi function maximizes (1 -8 2 )71(n,U), which is equivalent to the static profit maximization provided that 8 2 < 1 for all t. The optimal controi is u * (n) which by assumption is an interior solution to (3).
To demonstrate that 8 2 < 1 consider the costate equations:
where 71(n) == 71(n, u*(n» is the optimal static profit. Integrating (5) forward and inserting 8 1 in (6) implies that å 2 (t) = -QJte-r('T-t)(1-8 2 (1»1T'(n(1»d1. If at moment t it is true that 8 2 (t) < 1, but 8 2 (1) approaches 1, the time derivative å 2 (t) tends to O (In/(n)1 <00 for all positive n and 8 2 ( 1) remains below 1.
Since the optimal controi function u*(n) does not depend on the costate variables, we can ignore the costate equations and focus on the dynamics of the state variables n and v. This is described by the following system:
2.1 The industry evolution.
The industry evolution depends crucially on the shape of the net profit function flen) which is defined and continuously differentiable for all positive n. The interval (O, 00) is assumed to belong to the range of this function. Consider two cases when flen) is either monotonously decreasing for all n ( Fig.l) , or has an S-shape as depicted in Fig.2 .
Intuitively, the positive effect of competition on incumbents' profits is explained by R&D externalities such as technological spillovers and cluster effects. In what follows we derive the profit function flen) and demonstrate the positive external effect of R&D competition.
Given these two cases, there may be one, two or three stationary states of the system (7)- (8). From (7) the long-run value of the firm is v., = z in all cases. When v = v." there is no new entry into (or exits from) the industry. The steady-state number of firms in the industry n.,
is the solution to the equation:
If n = fl." the firm's value does not change. Thus, the steady state s differ only in the limit number of firms. In this section we do not deal with the case of two steady states. If the system (7)- (8) The characteristic equation for the system (7)- (8) is e -r~ + a7r'(n) = 0, and the eigenvalues are
< 0, there are a couple of real eigenvalues with different signs, and the stationary state in this case is a saddle point. When 7r' (n,.,) > 0, and a is sufficiently small, both characteristic roots are positive and the medium-Ievel equilibrium is an unstable node. If 7r' (n,.,) > 0, but a is large, the roots are complex-valued with positive real parts. Thus, the medium-Ievel stationary state is an unstable focus.
Define the equilibrium path as a trajectory of the system (7)- (8) converging to one of the long-ron equilibria. Given the initial number of firms Do, the equilibrium path is determined by the initial evaluation of the firm vo. Equilibrium paths for the above cases of the model behavior are drawn as solid lines in figures (3)-(5).
There is one saddle point when incumbent's profit is decreasing with competition, fr I (n) < O for all n ( fig.3 ). For each initial number of firms no there exists a unique initial value Vo that determines the equilibrium path. The industry converges to the long-run equilibrium n.., regardless of the initial number of firms.
When there are three stationary state s and the "middle" state is an unstable node, the industry evolution depends on the initial number of finns ( fig.4 ). If it is below the medium-Ievel number n.., = n 2 , then competition will be low in the long-run, since n tends to n.., = nI' the minimal limit number. If no is in the interval (n 2 , n 3 ), entry dominates exits and the number of firms converges to n.., = n3' the maximal equilibrium number. In this case the equilibrium path is unique: for each initial number of firms no there exists a unique initial value Vo that specifies the industry evolution to one of the long-run equilibria.
The industry dynamics are more interesting when the medium stationary state is an unstable focus. This is the case when the parameter a is large, which means that entrants' adjustment costs are negligible. The system (7)- (8) describes non-explosive cyc1ical fluctuations that are not dampened but transform to the regime of monotonous growth.
Cyclical movements are explained by the S-shaped profit function ll(n). When firm's value v exceeds opportunity costs z, the number of firms increases be cause of (7). As profit goes up, the value begins to decline, according to (8). When it becomes lower than entry costs z, the number of fIrms decreases.
An equilibrium path, departing from the medium-Ievel equilibrium, fluctuates around it with growing amplitud e and then converges to one of the saddles. There may be three cases portrayed in figures Sa-Se. In the first case there are two different equilibrium paths with cyclical behavior. One of them converges to the highcompetition long-run equilibrium n 3 , and another -to the low-
In the second case there is a unique cyclical equilibrium trajectory that comes to the maximal-Ievel equilibrium n 3 (fig.Sb) and the non-cyclical equilibrium path going to the minimal-Ievel equilibrium nI' The value of firms is notably below the cost of entry z when the industry moves along the non-cyclical path. The third case is the reverse of the second: the cyclical equilibrium trajectory converges to the low-competition equilibrium nI' while the non-cyclical path overestimates firms' value (as compared with entry costs z) and goes to the high-competition saddle point n 3 ( fig.5c ).
Similar cyclical behavior of equilibrium trajectories is demonstrated in a recent paper [Gali, 1994] reconsidering the 13 neoelassical model of economic growth in the presence of price markups. However, that paper mentions only the first case with two different cyelical equilibrium trajectories departing from the unstable focus.
The cyclical dynamics imply a multiplicity of equilibrium paths.
For a given initial number of firms llo there may be many inital values
Vo specifying the movement towards one of the steady states n l and n3.
There are infinitely many initial values Vo if the initial number llo coincides with the medium equilibrium n2.
The long-ron industry evolution is thus determined by the initial evaluation of incumbent firms, vo, given the initial number of firms llo.
The institution for this evaluation is the stock market. If it believes that the industry will move to the steady state with a low or high degree of cornpetition, it estimates the value of firms according to these expectations. 14 These results demonstrate the role played by the stock market, or more broadly by financial markets, in economic development. Their impact on economic growth is discussed in several recent papers, demonstrating the evidence that financial development correlates with growth (Pagano 1993 , At je and Jovanovic 1993 , King and Levine 1993 .
Initial values of firms
One interpretation of these empirical results could be that current or expected economic growth to alarger extent stimulates development of financial markets. In our model, however, the stock market is responsible for the initial evaluation of firms and, hence, for the pattern of the long-ron industry evolution and its dynamic efficiency.
R&D Externalities and Quality Ladders
We assumed ab ove that the profit function n(n) is monotonously decreasing ( fig.1 ) or has an S-shape ( fig.2 ). Now we suggest an explanation for this hypothesis based on a modified quality ladders mod el.
Following the existing quality ladders literature [e.g. Grossman and Helpman 1991, Segerstrom et al. 1990 , Segerstrom 1994 ] suppose that the industry product has a countable number of qualities j = -1,0,1,2,3, ... with higher quality represented by higher number j. 
The expected monopoly profit from each race is a product of 4 and the probability that the firm i will become a winner. Successful innovations arise as a result of a Poisson process with an intensity depending on R&D efforts and the number of firms in the industry.
The probability that one firm innovates successfully during the period dt is a function of R&D intensity h and the number of firms at the current moment n(t):
Pr (one firm is a winner) = h(l -ae-bn(t)dt,
where a, b are positive parameters, a < 1. All firms have equal chances at the beginning of time interval (t,t+dt). Hence, the probablity that any firm i innovates successfully is h(l -ae-bn)n-1dt.
The probability (10) roughly equals the probability that at least one firm innovates successfully because it is unlikely that two or more firms innovate successfully in a small interval. The exponential function (10) with discrete n is a limit case of Bernoulli trials, modelling attempts by each firm to promote innovations in the market. Let ID be the number of trials made by a firm, p be the probability that the attempt will be successful. Suppose there is a chance -for exogenous reasons -of one firm innovating successfully with out any trial with probability Po-Then the probability that at least one firm innovates successfully is 1 -(lPo)(I-p)mn. Given that the number of trials m is large and the probability p is small, this is close to the exponential function 1 -ae-bn , and a = l-po, b ~ mp.
T h e e x p e c t e d monopoly surplus from winning R&D races in the time interval (t, t + dt) is II( n,h )dt = & h( 1 -ae -bn)n-1 dt. The instantaneous expected net profit is:
where a o1 h o are firm's R&D expenditures as a function of R&D intensity. We suppose that a > 1, which means diminishing returns to scale in R&D on the disaggregate level. Segerstrom (1994) proposes R&D technology with constant returns to scale for the individual firm and decreasing industry-wide returns.
At time t firms choose R&D intensity maximizing (11). It is easy
to show that argmax h 7r(n,h) == h(n) = [&(1 -ae obn )n-1 ]1/(Ool). Inserting it in (11) we derive the instantaneous profit function
It is monotonously decreasing or has the S-shape. To simplify formulas let a = 2. In this case
The expression in square braekets is negative if e-bn > l/a(l + bn). This either holds for some interval of n bounded away from 0, or does not 18 hold for all n, because a < 1. Consequently, the profit function (12) is S-shaped or monotonously decreasing. The intuition behind the Sshape profit function is that the positive external effect of R&D dominates the negative effect of increasing competition.
The intensity of R&D is a monotonously increasing, concave function of expected profits. Indeed, from (12) h
Expected instantaneous profits 7l(n) are, in the industry evolution model, the same in the long-run equilibria with low and high numbers of firms. Hence the intensity of R&D is the same under high and low competition. R&D activity is persistent because the long-run expected profits are positive.
R&D Externalities and Production Costs Economizing.
A profit function with the above properties can also be derived from another model ofR&D competition. Suppose that product quality does not change throughout time and the R&D parameter is unit production costs c. Further we assume that there is cost pressure, e.g. The instantaneous net profit function can be represented as
where II(n,c) is defined as firms' expected operating profit and S (n, c) is R&D expenditures. As above, total consumer expenditures are E iS constant. The price is also constant in time and normalized to one.
Firms divide the market on equal shares, thus each currently producing E/n units of output. A representative firm expects to obtain operating profit:
R&D expenditure is a linear function of R&D intensity y(c):
where d(n) is the marginal cost of R&D which, because of externai effects, depends on the number of firms.
Suppose there is a lower technological limit for the unit costs c o < 1. For an individual firm R&D results in keeping the unit production costs at some level ab ove the technologicallimit. The closer unit cost c is to the minimalievei C o , the higher R&D intensity is and, consequently, the higher are R&D expenditures S(n,c). This is a close paralIei to the assumption of decreasing R&D returns used in Segerström [1994] and in the above quality ladders mode!. We choose the following function as a measure for R&D intensity:
which implies that R&D costs are unboundedly increasing if c converges to co'
Inserting (14)- (16) into (13) we have
Profit-maximizing unit eost is
and
Consider an example of the marginal R&D eost funetion:
where y is the positive parameter. The profit funetion (19) in this ease has the shape depieted in figures 1 and 2. Indeed:
The funetion (1 -e o )/n 2 either interseets yEe-vn / 2 in two points or locates above it for all n. In the former ease we have the S-shape of the profit funetion (19) as shown in figure 2 , and in the latter ease it is monotonously deereasing as depicted in figure L One can interpret (20) as a result of two opposite effects of new entry on the incumbent's profit. On the one hand, profit is decreasing with new entry through market eompetition, and on the other hand, it can inerease beeause of the positive R&D externality. Note, that the same is true for a more general dass of marginal eost funetions:
where B exeeeds -1.
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Consider which of the long-run equilibria of the industry evolution model yields higher R&D intensities. Using (18) the profit function (19) is represented as
that is
Since instantaneous profit 1l(n) is positive and equal in the long-run equilibria, (23) implies that c(n 1 ) > c(n 3 ). Thus, unlike the ab ove quality ladders model, R&D activity is more intensive in the highcompetition steady state.
2.4 R&D subsidies and industry evolution. 
(here (J =2). In this ease instantaneous profit turns negative for large n.
Suppose the government is able to intervene by subsidizing R&D through uniform lump-sum transfers. Formally the eonstant inerement S > O adds to the profit funetions (22) and (24). This modifieation signifieantly affeets the model's dynamics. As was pointed above the system (7)-(8) may have two steady states. This occurs when the S-shape profit funetion 7T(n) is positive for all n and the loeal interior minimum of this funetion beeomes the global minimum (if it is less than 1~ ..... 7T(n) = S). These steady states correspond to the low and medium degrees of competiton in the long-run ( fig. 6 ). The higheompetition steady state n 3 , thus, does not exist in the ease of two stationary states.
The equilibrium path starting from the unstable steady state n 2 goes to the low eompetition state n l . Those trajeetories of the system 23 (7)-(8) moving the number of firms to infinity do not converge to any long-run equilibrium and do not describe equilibrium dynamics. It means that R&D subsidizing implies a pattem of evolution which is the opposite of that generally intended by policy-makers. Subsidizing benefits all firms in the short-run, but in the long-run it decreases
finns' values and induces exits from the industry.
R&D subsidies are useful when two steady states do not appear, i.e. the loeal interior minimum of the S-shape profit function 7r(n) is higher than the amount of lump-sum transfer S. In this case subsidizing leads to disappearanee of the low and medium-competition steady states. Thus the dynamie is favourable, since it moves the industry to the unique high-competition state. However, policy-markers must be careful about the influence of R&D policy on the long-run evolution of industries. Therefore we assume, following equation (21) Further, following (19) profits are a function of d(n) such that
The complete function to be estimated is then
As an alternative we also estimate the quality ladder model which takes the following functional fonn.
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This ean be simplified to
Initially we treat a z in the unit eost eeonomizing model as a fixed, eons tant eost that is the same for all entrants. Estimating this funetion allows tests of whether there is support for the idea of R & D externalities.
As a next step we examine the eomposition of ehanges in n and test how these depend on various eountry-specifie faetors. In those estimates a z is interpreted as an entry eost that differs between eountries as a funetion of various variables like skill levels relative eosts and others.
27 Data A large part of the data come s from interview surveys among Swedish industrial firms that were conducted between 1987 and 1992. These surveys are described in Fölster (1991a Fölster ( , 1991b . We interpret these coefficients in figure 7 where the profit function is drawn for basic mode1 and the quality ladder model with In order to illustrate the implications of these results further a number of simulations are performed.
Simulations
Numerical analysis focuses on the influence of the real interest rate r on the industry evolution. The system (7)- (8) dynamics is simulated for the estimated parameters of the cost economizing model (Table 3 ). The behavior of trajectories for the quality ladders model does not differ much, so we present simulation results concerning only that mode!.
Simulations demonstrate that all above cases of industry evolution are possible for a quite narrow domain of the real interest rate: r E (0.005, 0,07). The result is shown in Table 4 where "focus-a, b, c" relates to the cases depicted in figures 5 a, b, c, respectively, and "un. saddle p." means that there is a unique long-ron equilibrium which is a low-competition state. Table 4 rxlOO%: 0.5 -2.8 2.85 -3.99 4.0 -5.74 5.75 -...
Dynamics: "focus-b" "focus-a" "focus-c" uno saddle p.
The case of unstable node ( fig.4 ) is obtained for a higher value of entry cost parameter z than we used in the simulation. The favourable zone for the real interest rate is 2.85 -5.75 %%, when the high-competition long-mn equilibrium is attainable. However in the interval 4.0 -5.75%% (case "focus-c") the stock market can undervalue firms and move the industry to the low-competition state.
Figures 8-10 demonstrate the trajectories of the system (7)- (8) for r = 0.01, 0.03 and 0.05. The long-mn equilibria n 1 and n 3 are characterized in Table 5 .
r Standard error in parentheses.
In table 6 the coefficients for the profit equation are similar as in the previous estimation. Of the country specific variables SALES, TECHCOMP and ED have the expected sign and appear significant.
The degree of subsidization appears insignificant and actually has a negative sign. We hesitate, however to interpret this as support for the 3S theoretical result that subsidies can push firms on to the adjustment path toward the Iow-Ievel equiIibrium. An alternative explanation could be that countries with few entrants more of ten subsidize research.
S. Conclusion
The analysis supports the notion that there can be ranges of aggregate increasing returns to research in which an industry can converge to different equiIibria. The empirical estimations yield results consistent with the hypothesis that sub si dies can reduce chances of reaching the high-number-of-firms equilibrium, while technological competence and education seem to increase chances. 
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